Curiosity, inquisitiveness, wonder, intellectual courage, grit, and perseverance are some of the emotions and dispositions that we experience in conjunction with epistemic processes such as inquiring, learning, remembering, and understanding. These states, which have been called “epistemic emotions”, seem to have a causal and perhaps conceptual connection with knowledge and various processes related to knowing. In addition, some dispositions, such as love of truth or respect for good arguments, seem to be part of a desirable epistemic character.
The aim of this monographic issue is to investigate the epistemic role of these emotions, affective experiences, and dispositions. This means discussing ongoing approaches to the role of emotions in rational processes and dispositions, as well as drawing connections between affective experiences, rationality, and cognition. This emerging line of investigation is ripe for renewed research because, until recently, few works have been dedicated to the topic, and even the existence of such kind of emotions is still controversial in the contemporary debate.
